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This article presents the principal findings of the Working Group on Incentive Structures in Institutional
Asset Management set up under the aegis of the Commitee on the Global Financial System (CGFS).
These findings, which have recently been published in a report, aim to give the central bank community
– and beyond that, the financial community – a better understanding of ongoing developments in the
fund management industry and their potential implications for financial markets.
The report, based on a comprehensive literature review and extensive interviews with market
practitioners, has identified various features and trends in the industry with a potential effect on the
functioning of financial markets. However, as many of these effects are at least partially offsetting,
the lack of reliable empirical evidence has not allowed the working group to come to a clear-cut
conclusion on the aggregate effect of these various features and trends at the current juncture.
Still, one broad conclusion may be drawn from this report: ongoing and future developments in the
fund management industry have the potential to change institutional behaviour in ways that can be
important for financial markets. This relates to the general issue of preserving the diversity of investment
behaviour, and partially results from the fact that parts of the institutional asset management industry
have moved towards becoming a «commodity» industry offering investors more and more standardised
investments products and approaches. Therefore, developments in the industry may require further
attention by the financial community as a whole. More specifically, the report points to four broad
areas where particular attention should be paid: risk management and disclosure, conflicts of interest,
explicit and implicit barriers to market entry, and regulatory trade-offs.
NB: Michel Cardona and Ingo Fender were Chairman and Secretary of the CGFS Working Group on Incentive
Structures in Institutional Asset Management, respectively.The changing incentive structure of institutional asset managers: implications for financial markets
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1|1 Industry structure
The institutional asset management industry has
become an important feature of modern financial
markets, with the scale of this business readily
apparent from the size of assets under management
in various countries (see graph 1).
Furthermore, because the assets managed by the
industry are strongly influenced by demographics,
the industry’s strong recent growth is expected to
continue well into the foreseeable future.
1| Asset management: an evolving industry
Institutional asset managers are firms and
professionals who construct and maintain investment
portfolios on behalf of their clients,
e.g. individual investors and companies. They are
frequently categorised as collective investment vehicles
(such as mutual funds, hedge funds), pension funds
(e.g. defined contribution and defined benefit
schemes) and insurance companies (life insurance).
Assets under management include fixed income
securities, equities and commercial real estate. See
figure 1 for a stylised presentation of institutional
investors and their activities.
1 See Bank for International Settlements (1998)
2     In September 2001, the CGFS established a Working Group to learn more about the institutional asset management industry, with a view to
enhancing the Committee’s understanding of how various types of incentive structures affect asset managers’ behaviour. The Working Group
on Incentive Structures in Institutional Asset Management was chaired by M. Cardona of the Banque de France and comprised representatives
from sixteen central banks (Reserve Bank of Australia, National Bank of Belgium, Bank of Canada, Banque de France, Deutsche Bundesbank,
Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Banca d’Italia, Bank of Japan, Banque centrale du Luxembourg, De Nederlandsche Bank, Banco de
España, Sveriges Riksbank, Swiss National Bank, Bank of England, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, European Central Bank) and a
secretariat at the Bank for International Settlements.
3 The Working Group’s report, CGFS (2003), can be downloaded at www.bis.org.
I
ncentive structures – i.e. various features that
have a bearing on decisions made by economic
agents – and their impact on financial market
developments are high on the agenda of those who
are charged with or are otherwise involved in monitoring
global financial markets. Against this background,
institutional investors and the phenomenal price
increases on world equity markets in the late 1990s
have recently attracted particular attention.
The institutional asset management industry has
grown substantially over recent years, becoming an
ever more important part of financial markets, and
its growth is expected to continue. As asset
management activities involve a series of delegation
processes, creating appropriate contractual structures
is essential for aligning the incentives of those
charged with the management of funds with the
incentives of fund owners. As a result, structural
changes in the industry, to the extent that they affect
asset managers’ incentives, are likely (and, in many
cases, intend) to influence managers’ decision
making. Thus, they are bound to affect market
outcomes and, potentially, market functioning.
Ongoing industry trends have, therefore, an obvious
potential to change institutional “investors’ behaviour”
in ways that can matter for global financial markets 1.
Against this background, the Committee on the Global
Financial System (CGFS), which monitors the stability
of global financial markets for the G10 Governors,
initiated a Working Group on Incentive Structures in
Institutional Asset Management 2. To provide a
foundation for its efforts, the Group started its work
by surveying the relevant literature and conducting a
small number of exploratory pilot interviews with
investment consultants. The literature review
informed the Working Group’s discussions and
highlighted several issues, such as the specifics of
contract design for institutional asset managers and
possible linkages between contractual relationships
and asset managers’ behaviour. These issues were
further explored in two rounds of interviews with more
than a hundred industry practitioners representing
various sectors of the institutional asset management
industry in fourteen countries. To ensure comparability
of results, the Working Group employed a set of
interview guidelines. This article summarises the
Group’s main findings, which have recently been
published in a report 3.The changing incentive structure of institutional asset managers: implications for financial markets
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1|2  Ongoing trends
While these changes have tended to blur differences
among various industry sectors and despite continuing
structural differences across countries, there are,
nevertheless, a number of broad industry trends
common to the entire institutional investor business.
First among these is the increase in the number of
distinct asset classes available to investors. That is,
the fact that the overall rise in professionally managed
assets across industry sectors, both in absolute terms
and as a share of overall financial wealth, was
complemented by rising interest in non-traditional
markets and instruments, including some recent
growth in funds placed with unregulated asset
managers and other alternative investment vehicles.
Graph 2
Relative importance of industry sectors
(As a % of total financial assets)
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NB: «Other» category defined as «Other forms of institutional saving, including foundations and endowment funds».
Sources: National data, OECD
Another important trend is the increasing popularity of
“passive” management strategies, i.e. index-based
portfolios, which has been driven by the development
of capitalisation-based benchmark indices and the
recognition that, in the largest, most efficient markets,
returns to information gathering are low and scale
effects large. Until recently, these developments were
further supported by rising stock markets, as passively
managed portfolios presented a cost-effective way of
assuming equity exposure in a bull market
environment.
The third broad trend is the industry’s tendency
towards increasing consolidation and specialisation. Due
to the scale economies 4 involved in managing
financial assets, particularly for closely-indexed
funds, consolidation in the industry has been
encouraged. In addition, increased indexing
The world-wide growth of the institutional asset
management industry, while being characterised by
notable differences across countries, tended to be
accompanied by a restructuring of the industry, that
is, a changing importance of its main categories over
time. It is worth noting that this evolution is not
uniform across countries (see graph 2).
More importantly, this has also meant that,
increasingly, the distinctions between these
traditional categories no longer fully capture the most
significant differences among industry players.
Insurance companies, for example, have launched
their own investment funds and have become
involved in pensions provision, while banks are
acquiring and launching money management and
insurance companies.
4       Scale economies in fund management arise, for example, from the practice of crossing (i.e. the offsetting sale and purchase of assets by clients
of the same asset manager) or from the fact that passive fund management avoids the possibility of churning (unnecessary trading activity
to generate commissions), both of which will save transaction costs for the client.The changing incentive structure of institutional asset managers: implications for financial markets
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2|  Industry features with a possible bearing
on manager behaviour
The broad, underlying trends reviewed above, beyond
their immediate impact on the industry and its
structure, have tended to also be reflected in changing
incentive structures for institutional asset managers
(i.e. the contractual components that make up their
incentive framework and the ways they are combined
– characterised by low fees – has also heightened
pressures on assets under management by active
fund managers, a tendency that has tended to reduce
the fee income for the firms managing these
traditional portfolios. As a result, intra-group
concentration has also been pushed forward.
Finally, due to the industry’s branching out into
research-intensive and non-core asset classes,
specialisation has been very pronounced among the
remaining active asset managers. As a result, the
number of highly specialised, non-traditional asset
management firms has grown rather rapidly.
with each other). These changes are, potentially, of
particular importance for financial market outcomes,
as they concern the core of the asset management
industry, i.e. the separation between ownership and
control of financial wealth (see box below).
 Delegation, principal-agent relationships, and incentive structures
The separation between ownership and control of wealth implies that delegated asset management involves
“layered” principal-agent relationships, for example between individual fund managers and the fund management
firm and, in turn, the fund management firm and the ultimate investor.
The existence of these agency relationships, and costs from monitoring the agents charged with managing financial
holdings, have encouraged certain contractual arrangements that seek to ensure prudent behaviour on the part of
the asset manager. As differences across industry sectors imply differences in agency relationships, this will, at
least in theory, imply very different, potentially complicated contractual relationships. In practice, however,
investment mandates tend to be based on sets of simple, easily verifiable rules enabling the ultimate investor to
monitor the asset manager, who is in turn operating within the boundaries of certain constraints. Fund management
contracts, therefore, tend to be characterised by three core components, various combinations of which are used
in an attempt to align incentives across agency layers. These are:
– a profit sharing rule/fee structure (to align incentives in terms of returns for fund managers and owners);
– a relative performance component measured against a benchmark (to monitor performance, make returns
comparable, and control for common uncertainty);
– and checks on risk taking (such as maximum allowable tracking error, reporting requirements and constraints
on available investment choices).The changing incentive structure of institutional asset managers: implications for financial markets
Banque de France • FSR • June 2003 99
2|1 Tiering and narrowing
of investment mandates
Historically, fund owners had left both strategic asset
allocation and tactical decisions in the hands of fund
managers. Over recent years, however, investment
mandates have become more stringent as a result of
a double shift:
– first, strategic asset allocation has increasingly
been «delegated back» to owners of funds away
from fund managers (e.g. the shift from defined
benefit to defined contribution pension funds
where, in principle, investors keep the discretion
to choose the type of assets they invest in);
– second, at the tactical level, rules laid down in
investment mandates have become more tightly
defined and fund management mandates have
become narrower (e.g. the increasing
specialisation of investment strategies proposed
to investors).
Overall, these tendencies have increasingly blurred
the dividing line between active and passive
mandates. This has led to sizeable amounts of funds
that are being managed on a passive or near-passive
basis and a tiering and narrowing of investment
mandates, which is mainly characterised by:
– a move from traditional funds (broadly-based
portfolios) towards more specialised mandates
focused on specific asset classes and investment
“styles”;
– the narrowing of permissible tracking error
(i.e. the portfolios’ return divergence) around a
given market benchmark. These limits on
deviations from performance targets are imposed
by investors in order to control the level of risks
taken by their asset managers; the lower the
tracking error, the lesser the discretion for asset
managers vis-à-vis the benchmark.
2|2 Relative performance
measurement
Against the background of the tiering and narrowing
of investment mandates, there have also been
changes in the way managers’ performance is
measured. The main feature of these changes is the
progressive shift from the use of peer group
benchmarks towards the use of market indices.
While the former measures the performance of a
given fund against the performance of an explicitly
defined group of peers (e.g. a category of funds
investing in the same asset class and/or following
the same investment “style”), the latter measures
the success of a given fund manager relative to the
performance of a given market, as defined by an
established index.
During the Working Group’s interviews, it was generally
recognised that directly basing each fund manager’s
performance on the performance of a peer group of
other fund managers is a potential recipe for copy-cat
behaviour. The increased use of market indices as
benchmarks of performance was therefore seen as an
improvement. However, interviewees also stressed that,
in the absence of counterbalancing effects, the
combination of tight limits on tracking error and the
use of only a relatively small range of core market
indices might lead to convergence of investor behaviour,
which might then affect market prices.
It was noted, for example, that overvalued
assets/stocks tend to find their way into major
indices, which are generally capitalisation-based and,
thus, more likely to include overvalued securities
than undervalued securities. Asset managers may
therefore be forced to buy these assets even if they
regard them as overvalued; otherwise they risk
violating agreed tracking errors 5. For the same reason,
once a given asset is included in an index, scope for
underweighting is also limited. Both effects together
lead to a trade-off between the risk of increased
tracking error and the risk of holding overvalued
securities. The problem is most severe for more
narrowly defined indices that may be dominated by
a relatively small number of individual securities.
5 Alternatively, asset managers can be forced to sell assets they might have liked to hold on to in cases where benchmark indices, as is common
with bond benchmarks, are based on rating-related criteria, such as the exclusion of sub-investment grade bonds. A downgrade to below
investment-grade would thus remove the respective issue from the index, though with a certain lag, triggering a rebalancing of investment
portfolios and the forced selling of the downgraded bond. Similar effects can occur if asset managers’ mandates contain ratings-based
investment constraints.
Several main developments can be identified and
are covered below.The changing incentive structure of institutional asset managers: implications for financial markets
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However, such effects may be subject to negociation
between asset manager and client, who might agree
on some degree of customisation, e.g. via limits on
particular assets.
2|3 Investment constraints
Furthermore, asset manager behaviour tends to
be subject to regulatory or client-imposed
investment constraints. The list of these
constraints can be rather long, depending on the
type of institutional investor and the regulatory
environment it is operating in.
Constraints can include:
– limits on the holding of certain types of assets
(e.g. equities, international assets, fixed income
investments 6,  or derivatives);
– mandated investments in specific securities
(e.g, forced diversification rules);
– limits on certain investment strategies (e.g. limits
on leverage or short-selling).
While such investment constraints aim to protect fund
owners and help to align the incentives of individual
wealth owners with those of their funds’ managers,
they also tend to limit the discretion left to the asset
managers subject to these investment constraints.
This, in turn, may affect overall investor behaviour
to the extent that restrictions on asset managers’
decision making on the tactical level are not
compensated by more active strategic reallocations
on the level of the individual investor. However, it is
important to stress that not all fund managers are
subject to such constraints; for instance, alternative
fund managers tend to have more discretion in taking
their investment decisions than other categories of
fund managers.
2|4  Performance review
and investment process
Regular performance reviews are known to potentially
induce asset managers to shorten their investment
horizons in the event of underperformance.
6  It is common, for example, for fixed income investment mandates to limit a fund manager’s investment choices to investment grade credits.
This serves to limit monitoring costs, while defining a broad maximum level of risk for the portfolio. Ratings downgrades may therefore trigger
mandated asset sales.
7 Industry practitioners tend to highlight possible adverse incentive effects inherent, in particular, in asymmetric performance fees.
In addition, asset managers appear to have themselves actively discouraged explicit performance fees as these tend to induce high earnings volatility.
However, the criteria applied in selecting asset
managers – notably by investment consultants – have
begun to increasingly focus on reproducible
investment processes and investment style
consistency. That is, growing attention is paid to
procedural aspects of the fund managers’ activities
(e.g. risk control, risk management) which are viewed
as leading to reproducible performance. As a result,
historical performance, although part of the evaluation
process, is (at least in the wholesale business, which
increasingly relies on consultants) no longer regarded
as the sole driving factor in manager evaluations. On
the one hand, this trend may have fostered higher
uniformity among asset managers and the ways in
which they execute their investment strategies (not
to mention the increased use of portfolio management
software packages). But, on the other hand, reliance
on investment processes may help alleviate pressures
on managers in time of underperformance that could
result from frequent performance reviews. Indeed, the
emphasis on defined investment processes may help
investors realise that performance can be influenced
by external events and may lead investors to assess
performance over rolling multi-year periods, which




While explicitly performance-driven fee structures
are on the decline 7, the industry (excluding hedge
funds and other alternative investment vehicles, with
their focus on absolute returns) increasingly favours
compensation schemes in which management fees
are a fixed percentage of assets under management,
with fee levels differing across management styles
and asset classes.
Although not performance-based as such, these
schemes reward the relative performance of asset
managers in an indirect manner, through fund
inflows. That is, the best-performing fund managers
are likely to attract new mandates or more mutual
fund investments to manage, therefore increasing
their fee income. Although indirect, this link between
performance and fees is known to generate incentives
for asset managers to react to recent portfolio
performance. In particular, the fear thatThe changing incentive structure of institutional asset managers: implications for financial markets
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The efficiency of financial markets relies on the
capacity of certain investors to act on, and correct,
seeming asset «pricing errors». Investors will tend to
sell or short overvalued securities while taking an
offsetting long exposure in close substitutes of these
securities in order to hedge their risks. However, such
arbitrage operations are inherently risky, as
mispricings can become worse before disappearing.
That is, even when prices ultimately converge with
certainty, such trades may generate substantial
temporary losses for the investor. Under risky
arbitrage, therefore, efficient markets require the
existence of investors with enough capital and
sufficiently long investment horizons to maintain a
given position until all available information is fully
incorporated into prices 9.
It is a traditional view to consider institutional investors
to be well placed to play this role, as their existence is
expected to favour a faster, more comprehensive and
thorough investment process, ranging from improved
information gathering and analysis to more consistent
decision-making. According to this view, arbitrage by
large institutional investors should, hence, stabilize
asset prices by making sure that prices do not
substantially deviate from fundamentals. Along the
same lines, given their relatively long investment
horizons, institutional investors would be expected to
serve as structural providers of market liquidity,
particularly in times of stress.
This, however, raises the question of whether there
are features in the incentive structure of institutional
asset managers that might affect the ability of these
investors to use their size and, in principle, relatively
long investment horizons to serve the various functions
outlined above, thereby contributing to efficient and
smoothly functioning financial markets. For example,
3|  Potential implications for the functioning
of financial markets
if the effective investment horizon of institutional
investors were to be limited, prices may not converge
early enough for their contrarian investments (i.e. risky
arbitrage positions) to be sustained, which would
prevent or delay the correction of any misalignments.
One often-cited theory of why this might happen is
based on the observation that, in many cases, fund
managers end up being evaluated against each
other 10. To avoid falling behind their peer group, they
may then have incentives to herd, i.e. close an
existing or refrain from establishing a new arbitrage
position, to avoid the reputational risk of acting
differently from their peers. Such effects can occur
for portfolios that formally rely on peer groups in
terms of reviewing performance, but can also be
compensation-based, in case fee structures contain
relative performance elements. Accordingly, fund
managers can become most constrained precisely
when they have the best opportunities to profit from
contrarian positions, i.e. when the mispricing they
are trying to adjust widens further. The fear of this
happening will make asset managers more cautious
in the first place, i.e. when putting on their initial
trades. As a result, arbitrage-based incentives might
be particularly ineffective in extreme circumstances
(i.e. when the mispricing widens).
Against this background, the above-mentioned
features of the institutional asset management
industry offer a number of potential implications for
financial markets, which fall into three broad areas.
While the absence of fully convincing empirical
evidence on each of these implications, including
potentially offsetting effects, makes judgements on
these issues difficult, it is still possible to single out a
number of influences emanating from changing
structural features in the asset management industry.
8 The rise of the so-called core-satellite approach illustrates all of the industry trends described above. Under this approach, institutional
portfolios typically consist of a passively managed core component, where an active management strategy is deemed to promise only
marginal risk-adjusted excess returns, and a peripheral component, which is meant to offer extra returns. The latter component, which may
include a substantial portion of overall assets, is divided among actively managed, satellite funds specialising in particular asset classes.
Active and passive mandates are strictly separated and, in many cases, handled by different asset managers.
9 See Shleifer (A.) and Vishny (R. W.) (1997)
10 See Scharfstein (D. S.) and Stein (J. C.) (1990)
underperformance may lead to cash outflows or loss
of mandates tends to create incentives to avoid
positions that can result in large deviations from
portfolio benchmarks. That is, the nexus between
performance, fund inflows and fees acts as an
implicit incentive mechanism 8.The changing incentive structure of institutional asset managers: implications for financial markets
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3|1 Market efficiency and volatility
Implications in this area relate to institutional
investors’ incentives and their ability to engage in
strategies that seek to profit from making informed
judgements about long-term asset price relationships.
Some of the ongoing developments suggest that this
ability might be reduced, thereby increasing the
potential for market misalignments:
– investment mandates have become more stringent. The
combination of narrowing and tiering investment
mandate, relative performance measurement
against market benchmarks, standard compensation
structures, and the tightening of allowable tracking
error could discourage managers from taking
contrarian positions;
– benchmarks tend to be chosen from a limited number
of established market indices. In such a context,
underperformance together with a comparable
group of asset managers will tend to be less
damaging than the risk of being singled out after
a contrarian position fails to perform in the short-
run. In addition, compensation based on relative
performance can lead to a shortening of managers’
effective performance horizons;
–   the increasing concentration of funds in specialised
portfolios (e.g. single asset class portfolios) together
with the tendency of individual investors to invest
based on past performance can give rise to
mechanisms that might feed asset price
momentum (e.g. new cash inflows in a particular
assets class will tend to be invested with those
managers adopting the investment style with the
highest recent performance); these mechanisms
may be amplified by possible feedback effects
resulting from partially replicated benchmarks;
– market efficiency might also be reduced if industry
consolidation and the associated consolidation of
research activity were to affect the process of
information gathering and aggregation performed
by institutional asset managers.
These trends lead to the well-known hypotheses that
first, ongoing industry trends might unduly affect
aggregate market efficiency and volatility; and that
second, institutional investors might systematically
contribute to large-scale asset price misalignments.
At the same time, however, other developments
suggest counterbalancing effects (i.e. trends reducing
the potential for market misalignments):
– the reduced reliance on peer-based benchmarks
(resulting in reduced incentives for copy-cat
behaviour). Whether reliance on market
benchmarks may result in similar copy-cat
behaviour  depends partially on how quickly fund
underperformance feeds into fund withdrawals
(this issue is further discussed in the report);
– the increased number of asset class choices
broadens the range of investment strategies
available to ultimate investors, a development
that goes with the «retailisation» of asset
management (i.e. the shift towards fund
management for retail customers). Altogether,
this might have reduced the potential for highly
correlated investment behaviours;
– the shift of responsibilities for strategic asset allocation
towards the owners of funds. The idea is that
diversity of behaviours will tend to be enhanced,
as large numbers of individual investors make
independent investment decisions on the strategic
asset allocation level;
– finally, the increased emphasis on investment
process (quality of the decision making and
managers’ ability to stick to the agreed
management style) may lead to lengthen or
maintain effective performance assessment
periods and help managers resist pressures due
to short-term underperformance.
Given these at least partially offsetting effects, neither
of the two hypotheses set out above has attracted
clear-cut empirical support. It is, therefore, uncertain
whether and to what extent changes to the incentive
structure of institutional asset managers have
affected their ability to counter asset pricing errors.
Nevertheless, short-lived misalignments along these
lines appear to be supported by observed data and
certain idiosyncratic effects at the level of individual
securities have been documented in empirical
studies 11.
11 See,  for example, Mitchell (M.), Pulvino (T.), and Stafford (E.) (2002), and Geczy (C. C.), Musto (D. K.), and Reed (A. V.) (2002)The changing incentive structure of institutional asset managers: implications for financial markets
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4| Policy-related findings
In the light of the argument set out above and
standing clear of more specific regulatory issues, a
number of policy-related recommendations can be
made. Many of these recommendations are, in turn,
related to the general issue of preserving the diversity
of investment behaviour and are based on the
conclusion that ongoing and future developments in
the fund management industry have the potential to
change institutional behaviour in ways that can be
important for financial markets.
A first implication is the need to ensure that, going
forward, ongoing industry trends do not result in
developments that could ultimately affect the
functioning of financial markets.
Therefore, providing ultimate investors with as large
a choice of potential investment vehicles and
strategies as possible seems to be key in diversifying
the behaviour of asset managers. This, in turn, calls
for promoting an environment in which ultimate
investors can take informed decisions about
investment strategies and about how these strategies
could best be implemented by asset managers.
Against this background, a set of more specific
recommendations arises, which fall into four broad
and somewhat overlapping categories.
Encouraging improved risk management
and disclosure
Many of the trends highlighted above suggest that risk
management demands on both the asset manager and
household levels are bound to increase. Improvements
in this area are therefore likely to be beneficial. In
addition, benefits can be expected from enhancing the
transparency of alternative investment vehicles,
particularly when offered to retail clients. Similarly,
the more risk is being transferred back to the final
investor, the more important the need for asset
managers to provide investors with clear information
on the characteristics of the products they are offered.
Awareness of conflicts of interest
Potential conflicts of interest are an inherent feature
of financial delegation processes. While
transparency, disclosure and a competitive
environment can go a long way in terms of restraining
or avoiding conflicts of interest, certain features of
the institutional asset management industry could
potentially bias the decisions of ultimate investors.
Against this background, the incentive structures of
investment consultants, index providers, rating
3|2 Other potential implications
Market liquidity
A similar reasoning applies to any effects on market
liquidity. While, in theory, trends in institutional asset
management could constrain the behaviour of
institutional investors in ways that might consistently
limit their ability to provide market liquidity, the
working group was not able to document such an effect.
On the contrary, institutional asset management may
have fostered issuance activity and securitisation in
various non-core markets, with consequences for the
relative trading liquidity of the respective assets. In
addition, assets included in prominent market indices
are likely to find their liquidity enhanced once
institutionally managed funds, whose performance is
benchmarked against these indices, include those
assets into their trading activities.
Risk management
In addition to these implications for overall financial
market performance, several developments in the
industry suggest an increasing emphasis on
ultimate investor decision-making and risk-taking
(e.g. the shift from defined benefit to defined
contribution schemes or the trend towards
specialised funds and away from broad-based
funds). This, in turn, is likely to increase the
structural demand for risk transfer instruments and
guaranteed investment products. As a result, the
need for risk management capabilities on the part
of those offering such investment products would
increase. Providers of such products would need to
accurately assess the costs involved and to ensure
correct pricing as well as put aside appropriate
resources to reserve against possible losses.The changing incentive structure of institutional asset managers: implications for financial markets
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12 Recent research based on retirement savings plan data, for example, suggests that individual portfolio choices might be unduly influenced
by the menu of funds offered to plan participants, which may result in inappropriate risk-return profiles. See Benartzi (S.)
and Thaler (R. H.) (2001).
agencies, and fund managers’ sales networks are
likely to gain more attention going forward 12.
Avoidance of explicit and implicit barriers
to market entry
To support market efficiency and liquidity, care should
be taken to maintain an environment that encourages
market entry by pooled investment vehicles in general
and by specialised investment pools seeking to exploit
arbitrage opportunities in particular. A similar reasoning
applies to other parts of the institutional investment
industry, particularly if characterised by a high degree
of concentration and potential conflicts of interest.
Awareness of regulatory trade-offs
Regulatory actions and accounting rules can affect
the efficiency and dynamics of financial markets. In
addition, regulation can hamper market development
by imposing constraints on the activities of
institutional asset managers. Regulation, therefore,
tends to involve a trade-off between the underlying
rationale for regulating financial markets, e.g. investor
protection, and the costs imposed on other market
participants. Moves towards further regulation should
therefore be carefully evaluated against the
background of these trade-offs, while current
regulation might be reviewed in the light of these
effects.The changing incentive structure of institutional asset managers: implications for financial markets
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